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The Shrinking Center: When Are Centrists More Effective Lawmakers?
Barack Obama’s signature promise in the 2008 presidential election campaign was to enact
healthcare reform, and, upon taking office, it was among his earliest major legislative priorities. In
January 2009 – the beginning of the 111th session of the United States Congress – Democrats held a
256-178 seat advantage in the House of Representatives and a 57-41 seat advantage in the Senate.
Ostensibly, Democrats had the margins to pass sweeping legislation at least in the House, but a
resolute group of centrist Democrats known as the Blue Dogs stood in the way. As Rubin (2017)
describes the centrist intraparty organization’s influence, “So long as the Blue Dogs could respect
the results of the organization’s voting procedures and maintain unity, the Coalition could continue
to hold the upper hand in negotiations with party leaders,” (Rubin 2017, 217). Indeed, the ardent
advocacy of the Blue Dogs and their moderate Senate counterparts was chronicled throughout the
media, and, ultimately, Democratic leaders had no choice but to acquiesce to many of the centrists’
fiscal concerns in the final bill such as elimination of the so-called “public option,” (Rubin 2017,
216-22; Dennis 2009; Lothian 2009).
The parties’ roles were switched when Republicans took their own shot at healthcare reform
in 2017 and the moderate Republican Tuesday Group stalled the party’s efforts to repeal the
Affordable Care Act (Kane 2017). Yet, moderates have also shown a capacity to break through
gridlock; in January 2018, an ad hoc “Common Sense Coalition” met in Senator Susan Collins’ (RME) office and, using a talking stick to limit one person to talking at a time, the group forged a
consensus to end a government shutdown (Ellefson 2018).
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Media coverage and public consciousness of the increasing polarization and endemic
gridlock in the U.S. Congress has become ubiquitous in recent years, and, in each of the last several
election cycles, retiring moderates have made their rounds to bemoan Congress’s lack of ability to
forge consensus and work across the aisle (see, for example, Tomasky 2017; Helderman 2012; and
Preston et al. 2010). Yet, amid this polarization, a plurality of Americans consistently identifies
themselves as moderates – with only three exceptions from 1972 until 2010, exit polls in each
biennial election showed that more Americans identified as moderates than either liberals or
conservatives – and books such as The Radical Center (2001) and advocacy organizations such as
No Labels have emerged to promote centrist ideas and candidates (Best and Krueger 2012). With
Congress’s approval rating failing to top 20 percent over the past eight years in the Gallup poll as
Americans continue to express frustration over the body’s inability to pass legislation, one might
assume that moderates matter more than ever in forging compromise and passing legislation (Brenan
2017). Volden and Wiseman (2011) developed an index – the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES)
– that sheds light on how to evaluate whether legislators are effective based on how many bills they
advance through the legislative process. Using that tool, this paper will explore under what
conditions moderates are, in fact, effective lawmakers.
Legislative Effectiveness
What makes an effective legislator? That question has consumed significant, though not
exhaustive, scholarly attention as far back as Davidson (1970), who aimed to define what attributes
effective legislators share. He suggested that, despite each legislator having different goals, any
measure of success must include writing and passing of legislation. Frantzich (1979) builds on this
work and measures success quantitatively through the number of bills passed in the 94th Congress,
finding that although ideologically moderate congressmen constitute an overrepresented group
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among those he finds to be effective, as a whole, those congressmen who were successful in getting
legislation passed actually saw a decrease in their electoral margins, suggesting that voters do not
always reward legislative effectiveness (Frantzich 1979, 425). Volden and Wiseman (2011) aim to
address the gap in scholarly literature for quantifying legislative effectiveness by developing the
Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) as a “transparent and substantively plausible technique for
measuring a legislator’s lawmaking effectiveness,” (Volden and Wiseman 2011, 238). Their score
encompasses lawmakers’ success in five components of the legislative process and weights
substantive and significant bills more heavily than ceremonial bills; the LES is the first numerical
index to measure legislative effectiveness, and it provides abundant opportunities for ongoing
exploration and application of the concept, which this paper endeavors to do.
Despite the robust nature of LES, it does have limitations; while, conceptually, enacting
legislation is a key component of effective lawmaking, surely the three examples of moderates
influencing the legislative process mentioned in the introduction of this paper are also examples of
successful exertion of political power to promote one’s policy agenda, yet, because, in those
examples, moderates did not push legislation of their own, their efforts would not be encompassed
in LES. Furthermore, securing federal money for one’s district is a feat in exertion of one’s influence
towards a political end, which, again, may well meet a definition of legislative effectiveness but is
not necessarily captured by LES. Moderates actually secure a seven percent increase in federal
funding to their district for every one standard-deviation increase in their proximity to the ideological
median of the House, Alexander, Berry, and Howell (2016) found, which supports the median voter
theorem’s conclusion that, when considering a single issue whose voters follow a standard
distribution, the equilibrium outcome corresponds to the median voter’s preference, making that the
most desirable point (for an overview, see Chaturvedi 2017, 1251). Cox and McCubbins (2005)
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expound on the median voter theory’s implications for those close to their party’s median in
Congress by suggesting that negative agenda control – the ability to keep items off the agenda,
typically exercised by the majority party – results in those bills that do make it on the agenda aligning
with the preferences of those close to the party median. However, these party medians are
increasingly polarized, so this finding suggests less about the overall effectiveness of centrists.
Passing legislation, however, requires legislative organization, which, in the modern
Congress, is typically manifested through political parties. Although party leaders tend to have the
greatest potential for influence in the chamber, that influence depends to a considerable extent on
institutional context (Cooper and Brady 1981; Fenno 1973). Without carrots and sticks, cajoling
disparate intraparty factions has proven challenging for party leaders on both sides of the aisle (Kane
2017; Dennis 2009). Former Speaker of the House John Boehner resigned in 2015 amid intraparty
conflict spurred by the right-wing Freedom Caucus, a successor to the Tea Party that thrust
Republicans to power in 2010 whose political positions Boehner found untenable (or, in many cases,
non-existent) and thus struggled to wrangle especially after he ended one of party leaders’
historically best carrots to wrangle reluctant voters (earmarks) and was reluctant to use sticks such
as committee reassignments (although he eventually did so in a few cases) (Alberta 2017).
The struggles of recent legislative leaders notwithstanding, securing a post in the party
leadership tends to be a boon for members of Congress seeking to build influence (Fenno 1973;
Meinke 2016). In both parties, leadership organizations and whip structures have grown
precipitously since the 1970s, particularly in the Democratic party, where centrism has, on occasion,
been a positive predictor of membership in the whip structure as opposed to the GOP, where centrism
has never been a positive predictor of holding a leadership position (Meinke 2016). Both parties have
long used peripheral leadership positions as carrots to engender party loyalty (Meinke 2016, 42-46).
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Traditional scholarship suggests that, when parties are divided, they tend to aim for more
inclusiveness and representation in their leadership structure, but during times of homogeneity, they
choose party loyalists (Meinke 2008). However, Heberlig and Larson (2012) show that the ability to
fundraise is a key to advancing in a party’s leadership structure, particularly in tight election years.
In fact, the ability and willingness to redistribute campaign funds to more vulnerable co-partisans
may well be increasingly overshadowing other criteria such as party loyalty and racial and gender
diversity as criteria for advancement (Heberlig and Larson 2007). This finding expands on their prior
research, which shows that members of Congress select ideological extremists over ideological
middlemen when the extremists distribute more money than the centrists (Heberlig, Hetherington,
and Larson 2006). In sum, their research suggests that moderates are largely being shut out of party
leadership positions, which ostensibly weighs down moderates’ potential to succeed in passing major
legislation.
Yet, even without presence in the party’s formal leadership, intraparty organizations such as
the Blue Dogs, Tuesday Group, and Freedom Caucus have each proven effective in promulgating
their respective agendas when they hold together sufficient capacity to stall the chamber, effectively
organizing pivotal votes into a single bloc (Rubin 2013; 2017; Lucas and Deutchman 2009).
Republican leaders have, however, been more willing to discipline recalcitrant moderates than
extreme conservatives (Pearson 2015, 170). Furthermore, Republican leaders can often convince
Tuesday Group members to fall in line more easily than Freedom Caucus members (Pearson 2015,
49). On the Democratic side, despite the Blue Dogs’ desire (and success) in promulgating centrist
policy priorities, Nancy Pelosi largely acquiesced or attenuated the concerns of Blue Dogs, bringing
them under the party’s tent during her speakership during which she secured record-high party unity
scores (Pearson 2015, 175). As such, Pearson concludes that moderate Democrats exercise greater
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influence in policy than moderate Republicans. Kirkland and Slapan (2017) conclude that
ideologically extreme legislators are less loyal to their party when it is in the majority, while
ideological moderates become more loyal when they transition to the majority, an assertion that
aligns with the cases discussed elsewhere in this paper.
Perhaps the most significant phenomenon in the study of moderates’ legislative effectiveness
is their declining number. As the ideological gulf between the two parties continues to widen (as it
has in nearly every election since the 1970s), the number of moderates in Congress has continued to
decrease (Thomsen 2017, 1). Much research exists on polarization in Congress and the asymmetric
nature thereof – namely, that Republicans have moved further right than Democrats have moved left
– but, in many cases, the declining number of moderates in Congress is considered as an endogenous
factor (on asymmetric polarization, see Grossman and Hopkins 2016). Thomsen, however, suggests
that a cascading effect – particularly on the Republican side, where rank-and-file members who value
doctrinal purity display more overt hostility towards their moderate co-partisans – wherein
polarization begets more polarization has led to fewer traditionally-qualified moderate candidates
running and more moderate legislators retiring irrespective of the electorate’s ideological tendencies
(Thomsen 2017; Grossman and Hopkins 2016). Maestas et al. (2006) cites data showing that being
an ideological moderate was a statistically significant deterrent to running for potential Republican
candidates for the House of Representatives, while it was not statistically significant in either
direction for Democrats. Thomsen asserts further that traditional explanations for why fewer
moderates run – gerrymandered congressional districts, money in politics, and an ideologically
extreme primary electorate – do not explain the dearth of candidates. Ansolabehere et al. (2010)
show that primary elections do not significantly send legislators’ voting positions further to the poles
even when the ideological composition of the primary electorate appears to be extreme; in other
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words, legislators are growing more extreme even as the electorate is not. Furthermore, Bafumi and
Herron (2010) show not only that members of Congress are more extreme than their constituents,
but that when a legislator is replaced by a new member from the opposing party, the new member is
also more extreme than the constituents, a concept they call “leapfrog extremism.”
Potential moderate candidates do still exist in state legislatures, the primary feeding pool for
the House of Representatives, but, evidently, they do not judge potential congressional service to be
a fulfilling proposition (Thomsen 2017, 54). Even controlling for seat type, district partisanship,
legislator experience, and ability to fundraise – and, as Kim (2011), shows, fundraising demands for
moderates far exceed those for more ideologically extreme candidates – liberal Republicans and
conservative Democrats “are much less likely to seek congressional office than those at the
extremes,” (Thomsen 2017, 97). Furthermore, moderates are also retiring at a faster pace than
extremists, and, through interviews, Thomsen finds that retired moderate legislators find life outside
of Congress far more rewarding than their work was prior to their retirement (Thomsen 2017, 121).
Each of these findings exacerbates the incumbency effect and results in Congress having fewer and
fewer “senior moderates.” Ultimately, Thomsen introduces a concept she calls “party fit” to explain
the dearth of moderates seeking and retaining office: essentially, moderates cease to fit in the modern
political party duopoly.
“The central hypothesis is that, in the current polarized context, the value of
congressional office is too low for liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats to
run. It has become increasingly difficult for ideological moderates to influence the
policy agenda, advance within the body, and forge bonds with their co-partisans.”
(Thomsen 2017, 35)
That moderates find a decreasing value in holding office is significant for two reasons,
Thomsen argues: it will exacerbate long-term polarization if parties do not have moderate anchors
at the center, and, as legislation is increasingly developed to win support of a single party, legislators
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at the chamber median can “neither credibly threaten to work with an increasingly distant and insular
opposition party nor muster significant numbers to influence the direction of their own party”
(Thomsen 2017, 50-52). Thus, partisan polarization is self-reinforcing insofar as the hollowing of
the political center has discouraged ideological moderates from running for and remaining in
Congress.
Whether this affects the overall legislative effectiveness of those moderates remaining in
Congress is an open question. As Thomsen compellingly argues, “[M]embers of Congress are part
of a team that has a clear policy agenda and benefits of the office are distributed based on their
adherence to this agenda” (Thomsen 2017, 35). In a theoretical sense, Volden, Wiseman, and
Wittmer (2013) argue in a paper on when women are more effective legislators than men that certain
institutional contexts such as contentious, partisan activities may help men outperform women when
in the majority, but that women’s propensity to form coalitions and introduce new policies may help
them outperform men when in the minority party. A similar finding seems plausible for centrists.
So, When Are Centrists More Effective Lawmakers?
Given rapid proliferation in congressional polarization, changes to the interbranch balance
of power over the past several decades, evolving campaign finance laws, and expanding party
leadership structures, identifying a singular answer to whether centrist legislators are more effective
seems implausible. However, harnessing the time series data in Volden and Wiseman (2011) allows
ample opportunity to make comparisons in legislative effectiveness across various institutional
contexts, which Cooper and Brady (1981) identified as key to effective analysis of legislative power.
Certainly, in the 1980s and 1990s, moderates in both parties found success when they worked
as a bloc that forced the hand of party leaders to make concessions towards centrism (Thomsen 2017,
36). For example, moderates such as Beverly Byron (D-MD) and Amo Houghton (R-NY) sat on
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powerful committees and achieved legislative goals, but party lines then were far blurrier than they
are today (Thomsen 2017, 27). Yet, moderates today lament an inability to foster interparty dialogue
or affect their party’s agenda as the parties drift towards the poles, clearly making it harder to be
effective (Thomsen 2017, 39). In spite of this polarization, I argue that attaining leadership roles and
securing desirable committee assignments and positions remain key components of being an
effective lawmaker. Further, I accept Volden’s and Wiseman’s conception of what makes an
effective lawmaker as manifested in the LES, cognizant of its aforementioned limitations relevant to
centrists, who may be more likely to exercise legislative power at veto points than to pass legislation,
a question that is worth investigating, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
As such, I hypothesize that, in a comparison of members of Congress, those who are centrists
will be less effective than those who are not centrists, and that the difference in effectiveness between
non-centrists and centrists increases over time. The independent variable under consideration is level
of centrism as indicated by the legislators’ DW-NOMINATE score, the standard measure in the
field, and the dependent variable is the legislators’ Legislative Effectiveness Score using Volden’s
and Wiseman’s dataset. In testing the hypothesis, I will control for whether the legislator is in the
majority or the minority, seniority, and race, each of which was a statistically significant factor in
Volden’s and Wiseman’s analysis (2011, 252). Ultimately, in addition to presenting aggregate data,
I will break down the data by session of Congress to identify trends such as whether, since the
Republican takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994, after which lawmaking was
consolidated to a much larger extent in the hands of the majority leadership and which many of the
interviews in Thomsen’s book identify as the moment in which being a moderate was increasingly
untenable, centrists have been less effective. I anticipate that the results before 1994, when moderates
recall frequently being courted for their vote and having their concerns taken seriously, and after
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1994, when – particularly on the Republican side – moderates bemoan overt hostility towards their
beliefs may diverge; if that is the case, further analysis will be warranted to identify a causal
explanation.
Research Design
Introduction
In order to test these hypotheses, I examined data from the Legislative Effectiveness Score
(LES) developed by Volden and Wiseman, which include data from 21 Congresses between 1971
and 2014 with observations from each of the 9366 members during that time period. I selected these
data because this index is the first significant attempt to quantify the effectiveness of legislators in
fulfilling their primary constitutional responsibility, passing laws. As discussed earlier in this paper,
LES has several constraints, the most obvious of which is that it conceptualizes lawmaking rather
narrowly: being the primary sponsor of a bill that advances in the legislative process. Brokering a
tough compromise, making a speech or engaging behind-the-scenes wrangling to encourage
affirmative votes, and exercising power at one of the many veto points to stop a piece of legislation
that a legislator opposes are not captured in the dataset. Furthermore, conceptually, it seems that
conservatives who favor small government may be less likely to propose new legislation and more
likely to try to block legislation that expands the government, activities that would result in a lower
LES score. Such a hypothesis would require additional analysis beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, LES provides a window into the effectiveness of legislators in lawmaking, which
makes it useful for this paper.
Variable Measurements
LES is measured on an additive scale that is normalized in each Congress such that the
average is 1 for that Congress (Volden and Wiseman 2011, 245). For introducing a bill that achieves
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any of five criteria – being introduced to the House, receiving action in committee, pass committee
and receive action on the House floor, pass the House, and become law – a legislator receives an
addition to his or her score, and the total additive score at the end of the Congress represents that
member’s LES. To account for the lesser impact of naming a post office than adopting a budget, the
score also divides bills into one of three categories: commemorative, substantive, and substantive &
significant. Bills that received year-end write-ups in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac were
deemed substantively significant, bills that provided for the renaming, commemoration, or
celebration of a person or event were deemed commemorative, and all other bills were deemed
substantive; the bills were thus weighed accordingly. The highest recorded value in the original
dataset is Charlie Rangel, who scored 18.69 in the 100th Congress while serving as Chair of the
House Committee on Ways and Means (Volden and Wiseman 2011, 242-46). Table 1, reproduced
from Volden and Wiseman (2011) shows the average impact of various activities on an LES score
through the 110th Congress (the original data go through the 110th Congress; subsequently, three
additional Congresses have been appended).
Table 1: Average Impact of Legislative Process Stages on Legislative Effectiveness (93rd to 110th Congresses)
Commemorative
Substantive
Substantive & Significant
Introductions
0.0023
0.0116
0.0231
Action in Committee
0.0146
0.0732
0.1464
Actions beyond Committee
0.0181
0.0904
0.1808
Passed House
0.0223
0.1116
0.2232
Becomes Law
0.0457
0.2285
0.4570
Source: Volden and Wiseman (2011), 247

To measure ideology, I use the DW-NOMINATE measure developed by Poole and
Rosenthal (1985), which places members on a scale of -1, which represents, most liberal, to 1, which
represents most conservative; the theoretical center – and my area of interest – is near 0. For the
purposes of generating descriptive statistics, I recoded DW-NOMINATE into a five-category ordinal
measure, each of which represents an equal interval of theoretical ideological space within the index.
As such, -1 to -0.6 represents extremely liberal, -0.6 to -0.2 represents liberal, -0.2 to 0.2 represents
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moderate, 0.2 to 0.6 represents conservative, and 0.6 to 1 represents extremely conservative. Using
this conceptualization, the underlying premise of the literature on centrism – namely the argument
of Thomsen (2017) – as well as the theoretical foundation for this paper – that centrists are declining
in number as Congress, and specifically the Republican party, moves to the right – is resoundingly
confirmed in Table 2.
Table 2: Ideological Composition of Congress Before and After 1994
Ideology using
Year at Start of Congress
DW-NOMINATE
Before 1994
1994 and After
Total
Extreme Liberal
158
169
327
Liberal
1970
1748
3718
Moderate
1263
294
1557
Conservative
1336
1357
2693
Extreme Conservative
80
816
896
Total
4807
4384
9191
Source: DW-NOMINATE score (Poole and Rosenthal 1985) recoded to five categories, each
representing the same theoretical ideological space

Table 3 shows the mean legislative effectiveness for each group over the entire span of the
data (1971-2014) (a graphical representation of which is shown in Figure 1), and Table 4 splits the
timeframe almost in half – before 1994 and since 1994 – to begin probing the notion that moderates
may have become less effective in the Gingrich era and beyond.
Table 3: Legislative Effectiveness by Ideological Group
Mean
Std. Err.
[95% Conf. Interval]
Extreme Liberal
1.162158
.0819513 1.001516 1.322801
Liberal
1.104687
.02873
1.04837
1.161004
Moderate
.8475347
.0346334 .7796454 .9154239
Conservative
.9198844
.0280676 .8648657 .9749031
Extreme Conservative
1.025621
.0532819 .9211766 1.130065
Source: LES and DW-NOMINATE recoded to five categories, each representing
the same theoretical ideological space
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Figure 1: LES, by Ideology
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Table 4: Legislative Effectiveness by Ideological Group Before and After 1994
Mean
Std. Err.
[95% Conf. Interval]
Extreme Liberal Pre-1994
1.402041 .1127945 1.180939 1.623143
Extreme Liberal Since 1994
.9378895 .1161077 .7102927 1.165486
Liberal Pre-1994
1.543917 .047705 1.450405 1.63743
Liberal Since 1994
.6096734 .0240827 .5624659 .6568809
Moderate Pre-1994
.8234099 .0379739 .7489726 .8978472
Moderate Since 1994
.951173 .0837098 .7870832 1.115263
Conservative Pre-1994
.3752659 .0128106 .3501542 .4003775
Conservative Since 1994
1.456075 .0501725 1.357726 1.554424
Extreme Conservative Pre-1994
.3431658 .03487 .2748129 .4115187
Extreme Conservative Since 1994 1.092528 .057881 .9790687 1.205988
*Source: LES Data (Volden and Wiseman) and Poole’s DW-NOMINATE score
recoded to five categories, each representing the same theoretical ideological
space
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Noting the high overlap in confidence intervals and cognizant of the breadth of endogenous
factors that may affect legislative effectiveness, I added several control variables to isolate the affect
of ideology on LES.
Model Estimation
Because both the independent and dependent variable are interval level measurements, I used
OLS regression to approximate the expected values for LES under a variety of conditions and
controls. I ran two separate interactions and thus two separate models to analyze the effectiveness of
legislators by ideology before and after 1994 as well as the effectiveness of legislators by ideology
based on their seniority, cognizant that seniority is clearly suggestive of one’s likelihood to hold key
committee assignments and chairmanships as well as one’s general influence.
In the first model, which interacted ideology and seniority, I controlled for majority status,
chairmanship of a committee or subcommittee, party affiliation, and gender. Each of the control
variables is a nominal level of measurement represented by a dummy variable, so I held each at their
respective modal values (1 for majority status and party affiliation (Democrat=1), 0 for all others
(Female=1)).
In the second model, which interacted ideology and whether the term in question was before
1994 or since 1994, I controlled for seniority, majority status, chairmanship of a committee or
subcommittee, party affiliation, and gender. Seniority, an interval level measure wherein a score of
1 indicates a member is in his or her first term of service, 2 indicates second, and so forth, was held
at its mean value, while all other control variables, as in the first model, were held at their modal
values as indicated.
Results
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Model 1: Interaction of Ideology and Seniority
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Figure 3: Legislative Effectiveness by Seniority & Ideology

Sr Cons

Jr Cons
Sr Mod
Jr Mod
Sr Lib
Seniority & Ideology as indicated by DW-NOMINATE

Jr Lib

Data source: LES dataset. Results estimated using linear regression,
holding leadership status, majority status, and gender at their modal values.
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VARIABLES
dwnom1
seniority
seniorconservative
majority
chair
subchr
dem
female
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
les
-0.271***
(0.0760)
0.0579***
(0.00363)
0.00691
(0.00720)
0.496***
(0.0323)
3.183***
(0.0639)
0.818***
(0.0357)
-0.336***
(0.0582)
0.0586
(0.0431)
0.234***
(0.0388)
9,194
0.422

This model gives strong support to the value of seniority in determining legislative
effectiveness, but, as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals for moderates and liberals
among junior and senior members and overlapping of confidence intervals for all three ideological
groups, provides no evidence to reject the null hypothesis, that moderates and non-moderates are
indistinguishable with respect to legislative effectiveness. The regression coefficients confirm
Volden and Wiseman’s findings (2011) that committee and subcommittee chairmanship as well as
status in the majority are among the best predictors of legislative effectiveness. Seniority and party
affiliation bore lesser – yet still statistically significant – regression coefficients. This analysis
produced no statistically significant findings with respect to the effect of gender on legislative
effectiveness. In sum, this model provides no evidence to support the hypothesis that centrists are
less effective than non-centrists in passing legislation.
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Model 2: Interaction of Ideology and Term of Service
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5

Post 1994 Lib

Pre 1994 Lib

Post 1994 Mod

Pre 1994 Mod

Post 1994 Cons

Pre 1994 Cons

.4

Expected Value of LES

Figure 4: Legislative Effectiveness by Ideology & Year of Service

Ideology as indicated by DW-NOMINATE and Term of Service

Data source: LES dataset. Results estimated using linear regression,
holding leadership status, majority status, and gender at its mode
and seniority at its mean

VARIABLES
dwnom1
since1994
dwnomsince1994
seniority
majority
chair
subchr
dem
female
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
les
-0.315***
(0.0862)
0.0890***
(0.0265)
0.0548
(0.0886)
0.0560***
(0.00362)
0.485***
(0.0415)
3.185***
(0.0639)
0.826***
(0.0358)
-0.358***
(0.0589)
0.0321
(0.0439)
0.217***
(0.0405)
9,194
0.422
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This model provides no evidence to reject its corresponding null hypothesis, that, since 1994,
moderates have grown less effective as legislators in the post-Gingrich era. In fact, for none of the
three ideological groups has the expected value for legislative effectiveness changed at a statistically
significant level within this time gradation. Notably, however, pre-1994 conservatives appear less
effective than post-1994 moderates and post-1994 liberals. Prior to 1994, Democrats held a majority
in the House of Representatives, a majority that Republicans seized in 1994 and held through 2006
and again after the 2010 midterm elections. This finding may suggest that Democrats are more
effective at legislating from the minority or that, as noted above with respect to the theoretical
constraint of the LES model, that conservatives are inherently less apt to advance legislation and
thus – in the construction of this model – engage in “effective lawmaking.” And, as with the previous
model, the regression coefficients remain largely the same or very similar, and the same control
variables that indicated statistical significance previously indicate it once again. In sum, this model
provides no evidence to support the hypothesis that centrists have become less effective in the postGingrich era, and, furthermore, it provides no evidence that centrists are less effective than
conservatives or liberals as lawmakers.
Discussion and Conclusions
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in either case. As such, the data – at least in the
permutations examined – does not support the theoretical argument I made that, as centrists have
declined in number (which is established by the data), they have decreased in effectiveness. This is
an interesting finding particularly with respect to the work of Thomsen (2017), who shows
compellingly that, as moderates exhibit declining values of “party fit” (ideological adherence to their
party), they are more apt to be defeated or, more likely, to retire. To some extent, this may suggest
that those legislators who remain in Congress are those who are more effective, which may help to
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explain the relative consistency of moderates’ LES score across time despite their decreasing
numbers. Similarly, those moderates who do decide to stay and continue to get re-elected establish
the seniority that helps all legislators be more effective. Further research could help confirm or
disprove those hypotheses.
What is clear is that moderates have declined precipitously in number, yet, at the same time,
their effectiveness has not decreased correspondingly. Future research should analyze the
effectiveness of moderates within narrower time windows – such as the periods of House
speakerships – as well as longitudinal data showing the effectiveness of moderates over time to drill
deeper into the question of under what conditions moderates are more effective legislators. Such
research could also help voters – who exhibit profound antipathy towards the overall ineffectiveness
of Congress – know which types of legislators are more apt to get things done. Until then, the current
gridlock may well continue.
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